We study how a mortgage reform that enabled home equity-based borrowing had an impact on entrepreneurship, using individual-and firm-level micro data from Denmark. The reform allowed entrepreneurs to bypass the project screening function of banks, by instead relying on the value of housing collateral to access credit. This enables us to study the efficacy of banks' screening technologies by examining the quality of the marginal entrants who benefited from reform. As expected, the reform relaxed constraints and led to an increase in entrepreneurship through the collateral channel. However, on average, new entrants were more likely to start businesses in sectors where they had no prior experience, were more likely to fail and had lower performance than those who did not benefit from the reform. Our results provide evidence that despite asymmetric information and opacity in startup lending, banks' screening can play an important role in credit allocation to more promising entrepreneurs. In such instances, the marginal individuals selecting into entrepreneurship when they can bypass bank screening will tend to start businesses that are of lower quality than the average existing businesses, leading to an increase in churning entry that may not translate into an equivalent increase in the overall level of entrepreneurship. 
Home Equity Finance and Entrepreneurial Performance -Evidence from a Mortgage Reform
I Introduction
Startups play a disproportionate role in aggregate job creation and productivity growth (Haltiwanger et al 2013, Adelino, Severino and Schoar, 2015) . Since young businesses' principal source of external finance is bank debt (Robb and Robinson, 2013) , a large literature in finance has examined how factors such as relationship banking, bank structure and banking competition can mitigate financing constraints for startups by reducing asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger et al, 2005; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Kerr and Nanda, 2009 ).
More recently, several papers have documented the role that home equity can play in facilitating bank lending to startups (Adelino, Severino and Schoar, 2015; Schamlz, Sraer and Thesmar, 2014; Corradin and Popov, 2015; Kerr, Kerr and Nanda, 2015) , since home equity allows banks to rely on pledgable collateral when their screening technology cannot fully overcome the challenges associated with asymmetric information on young firms' businesses (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar, 2012) .
Importantly, however, access to housing collateral has two distinct effects on entrepreneurship:
the option to liquidate housing assets eases financing constraints but in addition, relying on housing collateral shifts the lender's focus away from screening the startup's attributes to the value of, and ability to seize, the entrepreneur's home (Corradin and Popov, 2015; Black, de Meza and Jeffreys, 1996) . Home equity finance therefore effectively allows entrepreneurs to bypass the project screening function of the banking sector. The characteristics of previously constrained entrants who can use housing collateral to finance their entry will depend on how well banks can screen on startup attributes. In particular, if banks' screening technology works well, then the marginal entrant who benefits from access to home equity finance will tend to either be more risky, or of lower-quality.
In this paper, we study how an exogenous increase in access to housing collateral due to a mortgage reform had an impact on entrepreneurship, using individual-and firm-level panel data, drawn from administrative records in Denmark. As we elaborate further in section II B, the reform enabled home owners, for the first time, to borrow against their home for purposes other than financing the underlying property. The resulting increase in available home equity was large, equivalent to over a year's disposable income for the median treated individual in our sample. We document that differences in the timing of individuals' home purchase relative to the reform led to systematic cross-sectional variation in the intensity of the reform's treatment across home owners, even after controlling for detailed life-cycle and demographic characteristics. That is, home owners who bought their homes shortly before 1992 had paid down less of their mortgage and hence had less home equity available to borrow against compared to home owners who bought their homes well before the reform. Since the notion of home equity finance did not exist prior to this reform and the reform itself was passed within three months, our identification is predicated on the reasonable assumption that the timing of an individuals' house purchase several years before the reform was not driven by their desire to unlock home equity for entrepreneurship. We use this exogenous variation in access to home equity to study the impact how an increase in the value of housing collateral has an impact on entrepreneurship. A key element of our study is that we can not only measure the magnitude of the response to relaxed constraints, but are also able to characterize the marginal entrants in terms of the background of entrepreneurs, as well as startups' survival, profits and employment. As discussed above, this allows us to study the presence of financing constraints but to also shed light on the quality of banks' screening technologies at the time of the reform.
Our detailed data on household balance sheets allows us to trace the effect of the reform through home-equity based borrowing to an increase in entrepreneurship, driven both by an increase in new entrants and the longer survival of existing firms. We find particularly strong effects for entrants who had the largest increase in access to collateral, and those entering capital intensive sectors, highlighting how home equity-based borrowing helped entrepreneurs raise finance for their business.
When looking at the characteristics of the businesses, we find that the reform led to an increase in long-term entry, particularly among those with the greatest increase in housing collateral. However, on average, new firms founded by entrants who benefited from the reform had significantly greater failure rates than those founded by individuals who did not immediately benefit from the reform.
Moreover, surviving firms had lower sales, profits and employment relative to the control group, suggesting that on average, businesses started by the marginal entrant who benefited from the reform were of lower quality than those started by equivalent individuals who did not get increased access to housing collateral (rather than just being riskier). Our finding that a large share of those using housing collateral to finance their startups founded lower quality businesses provides evidence that despite asymmetric information and opacity in startup lending, banks' screening plays an important role in credit allocation to more promising entrepreneurs. This disciplining role of bank finance seems particularly valuable given growing evidence of entrepreneurial optimism and overconfidence (Astebro et al, 2014; Landier and Thesmar, 2009 ) as well as non-pecuniary motivations for self employment that may induce individuals to "consume" entrepreneurship by starting low performing firms (Hamilton, 2000; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011) .
From a theoretical perspective, our results have important implications for models of financing constraints in entrepreneurship. Several canonical models of financing constraints in entrepreneurship (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004 ) assume that the degree to which credit is rationed is independent of the quality of entrepreneurial projects -and hence predict that the marginal entrant when constraints are relaxed is at least as good as the average entrant prior to a relaxed constraint. We show in section IIA that without this assumption, such models can in fact shed light on how banks' ability to screen projects will impact the quality of the marginal entrepreneur who selects in when constraints are relaxed. Our findings are also relevant to the broader empirical literature on financing constraints and entrepreneurship, particularly studies of how home equity (e.g., Schmalz, Sraer and Thesmar, 2014; Corradin and Popov, 2015; Kerr, Kerr and Nanda, 2015) and bequests (e.g., Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994; Andersen and Nielsen, 2012) impact entrepreneurship. Our paper provides a framework to compare these results as it suggests that differences in the response rate and performance of the marginal entrant across these studies is likely to be driven by the characteristics of the banking sector in those settings. We discuss these differences in greater detail in Section IIC. Relatedly, our results highlight that in well-developed banking markets, relaxed constraints that also lower banks' incentives to screen on project quality may well lead to entrants that are of lower quality than the average existing businesses, so that policy solutions such as loan guarantee schemes that may simultaneously lower the discipline of bank finance can be less effective than originally anticipated (Lelarge, Sraer and Thesmar, 2010) .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section II, we discuss theoretical models of financing constraints and elaborate on the mortgage reform we study to position our paper in the literature. In Section III, we outline the data used in the analyses. Section IV outlines our identification strategy, discusses our results and the robustness tests we perform. Section V concludes.
II Housing Collateral and Entrepreneurship

II.A Theoretical Considerations
Since new businesses typically require some amount of capital investment before they can generate returns, the expected value of a new venture is an increasing function of the capital invested in the startup, up to an optimal level. Theoretical models of entrepreneurship (e.g. Evans and Jovanovic, 1979; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004) typically assume a collateral constraint, independent of entrepreneur ability, that caps the extent to which an entrepreneur can raise capital. This implicit assumption, together with the fact that capital and entrepreneurial ability are assumed to be gross complements, delivers a key prediction of such models that the marginal entrepreneur who benefits from relaxed constraints is one whose ability is at least as good as the average unconstrained entrepreneurs.
For example, in the Evans and Jovanovic (1989) model, business owners generate profits y = θk α , where θ reflects the quality of the project, k is the amount of capital input, and α determines the marginal return to the input of capital. Total income, I, is determined by profits and returns on net financial assets I = y + r (z − k) where r is the interest rate and z is wealth. The individual chooses entrepreneurship over wage employment if total income from entrepreneurship exceeds total income from their outside option. In Evans and Jovanovic (1989) , entrepreneurs can borrow an amount corresponding to a fraction λ of their wealth, so that the borrowing constraint is k ≤ λz.
Since, by design, the optimal capital is rising in project quality and the borrowing constraint is not, better entrepreneurs will be more constrained for any given level of wealth, and a relaxation in the collateral constraint, λz implies that entrepreneurs who benefit will be ones with higher ability entrepreneurs or those with better projects. 1
We depart slightly from such models to explicitly consider two distinct sources of borrowing that entrepreneurs have access to. The first, that we refer to as cash flow-based borrowing, d, refers to bank lending based on firms' cash flows from operations. To the extent that banks have good screening technologies, this lending can be independent of collateral that is pledged by the borrower and will be based on the merits of the project, so that d (θ). The second, that we refer to as collateral-based borrowing, refers to the fact that banks' screening technologies may not be able to fully resolve asymmetric information, so that banks may choose to lend some fraction of pledgable collateral, λ (z), which they can liquidate in the event that the firm defaults on its obligations. In this framework, k ≤ d (θ) + λ (z) and the canonical models that focus on collateral constraints can be seen as a special case where cash flow based financing is not feasible, that is where d (θ) = 0.
In fact, cash flow-based lending to young and small businesses is quite common. For example, the Survey of Small Business Finances suggests that about 60% of lines of credit and working capital loans are unsecured in the US. Even for fixed capital investments, a third of equipment loans are reportedly not backed by collateral. Further, Kerr, Kerr and Nanda (2015) 
document
1 In these models, entrepreneur ability and project quality are treated as being analagous and hence interchangeable.
evidence from the Survey of Business Owners in the US which shows that less than 15% of US small business owners report using their home as collateral for external financing.
Allowing for cash flow lending that is related to the merits of a project changes the predictions regarding the distribution of ability among constrained entrepreneurs compared to those who are funded. As banks' screening technology improves, the entrepreneurs who receive financing will tend to have better performing firms than those that are turned down. In the extreme, where banks' screening technologies work perfectly, all projects that merit funding receive it and in such a setting, relaxing a collateral constraint should either have no effect, or may lead to entry by lower quality entrepreneurs with non-pecuniary motives for engaging in entrepreneurship, who were denied credit based on projected cash flows, but may choose to "consume entrepreneurship" by borrowing against their home. Thus, the strength of the response to a relaxed collateral constraint as well as the quality of the marginal entrant both depend on, and shed light on, the size of financing frictions and the quality of the screening technologies among financial intermediaries.
The Danish mortgage reform provides a good setting to study such a relaxation in collateral constraints. As we elaborate in the section below, the reform enabled specialized mortgage banks to use housing equity as collateral for loans used to finance consumption or investment for the first time. Commercial banks were not impacted by the reform, and could continue lending to entrepreneurs based on the merits of their project (as well as potentially using equipment and commercial property as collateral), as they had done before. In the framework outlined above
The λz after 1992 refers to the incremental ability for individuals to borrow from mortgage banks based on housing collateral if they did not get sufficient credit from commercial banks. The entrepreneurial response to the relaxed collateral constraints can therefore shed light on the quality of the screening by commercial banks prior to the reform.
II.B The Danish mortgage market and the mortgage reform of 1992
Given the importance of the mortgage reform for our analysis, we turn in this section to outlining the financing context for startups and the details of the reform.
Until 2007, mortgage debt in Denmark was provided exclusively through mortgage banks, which are financial intermediaries specialized in the provision of mortgage loans. The Danish credit market reform studied in this paper took effect on 21 May 1992. The reform was part of a general trend of liberalization of the financial sector in Denmark and in Europe, although the exact timing appears to be motivated by its potential stimulating impact to the economy during the recession of 1992. 2
The reform was implemented with short notice and passed through parliament in three months.
The short period of time from enactment to implementation is useful for our identification strategy as it suggests that it is unlikely that the timing of individuals' house purchases was systematically linked to a forecast of unlocking housing collateral for the business. The reform changed the rules governing mortgage loans in two critical ways that are relevant to our study. The most important here is that it introduced the possibility of using the proceeds from a mortgage loan for purposes other than financing real property, i.e. the reform introduced the possibility to use housing equity as collateral for loans established through mortgage banks where the proceeds could be used for, among other things, starting or growing a business. The May 1992 bill introduced a limit of 60% of the house value for loans for non-housing purposes. This limit was extended to 80% in December 1992. A second feature of the reform increased the maximum maturity of mortgage loans from 20 to 30 years. For people who were already mortgaged to the limit prior to the reform, and who therefore could not establish additional mortgage loans for non-housing consumption or investment, this option potentially provided the possibility of acquiring more liquidity by spreading out the payments over a longer period and hence reducing the monthly outlay towards paying down the loan.
The highly structured mortgage market in Denmark at the time was such that the equity unlocked by the reform was driven largely by the timing of the house purchase and the level of the down-payment. That is, interest only mortgages did not exist at the time, and while it was possible to refinance mortgage loans prior to the reform to lock in lower interest rates, refinanced loans had to be of the same maturity as the original loan and the principal could not be expanded.
Similarly, people could prepay their loan, but having done so, it was not possible to extract equity through a mortgage loan on the same house. As shown in Table 1 , these restrictions implied that mortgage-loan-to-value ratios across individuals in 1991 were determined to a large extent by the timing of the house purchase relative to the reform. Individuals therefore entered the post-reform period with different loan-to-value ratios, implying a differential ability to use home equity to finance their businesses. We use this cross-sectional variation in the available equity at the time of the reform to identify the effect of getting access to credit by comparing the propensity to become a business owner across households who entered the reform period with high vs. low amounts of housing equity that could be used to collateralize loans for the business. Section IV A provides a more detailed description of our identification strategy.
Commercial banks were not restricted in offering conventional bank loans, either before or after 1992. However the granting of such bank loans was subject to a regular credit assessment based on project's projected cash flows as opposed to solely on the basis of the value of housing collateral, as was the case with the mortgage banks. 3 Overall, therefore, the reform allowed individuals with housing collateral who could not previously obtain loans through commercial banks to now get access to credit through mortgage banks.
II.C Positioning this study in the literature
Our paper is related to the growing literature on the importance of housing collateral for alleviating credit constraints in entrepreneurship (Schamlz, Sraer and Thesmar, 2014; Bracke, Hilber and Silva, 2014; Corradin and Popov, 2015; Kerr, Kerr and Nanda, 2015) , although these papers do not focus on the specific question we study.
Aside from the difference in the question, our approach is distinguished from these papers by two main features. First, our identification is driven by cross-sectional variation in the intensity of the reform's treatment across individuals, rather than by differential house price growth across regions. As Kerr, Kerr and Nanda (2015) point out, a significant element of the relationship between house prices and entrepreneurship appears to be driven by intra-city aggregate demand.
Our approach relies on comparing individual-level variation in home equity, implying that we can control for aggregate demand at very narrowly-defined geographic levels. Our specifications include the equivalent of zip code-by-year fixed effects, so that we are in effect comparing the response of 3 When granting a mortgage loan for a home in Denmark, the mortgage bank issued bonds that directly matched the repayment profile and maturity of the loan granted. The bonds were sold on the stock exchange to investors and the proceeds from the sale are paid out to the borrower. Once the bank had screened potential borrowers based on the valuation of their property and on their ability to service the loan, all borrowers who were granted a loan at a given point in time faced the same interest rate. This was feasible because of the detailed regulation of the mortgage market. First, mortgage banks were subject to solvency ratio requirements monitored by the Financial Supervision Authority, and there was a legally defined threshold of limiting lending to 80% of the house value at loan origination. In addition, each plot of land in Denmark has a unique identification number, the title number, to which all relevant information about owners and collateralized debt is recorded in a public title number registration system. Mortgage loans have priority over any other loan and the system therefore secures optimum coverage for the mortgage bank in case of default and enforced sale. Creditors can enforce their rights and demand a sale if debtors cannot pay. Furthermore, mortgage banks accumulate a buffer through contributions from all borrowers, and they use this buffer to cover loans defaults. The combination of the regulation around mortgage lending and protection afforded by the title registration system and the buffer to cover loan defaults implied that the loans offered by mortgage banks were very safe, justifying lending based solely on the value of collateral.
individual neighbors who happen to have differential access to home equity based on when they bought the home, which is plausibly orthogonal to entrepreneurship due to the reform. 4 Further, since we have an individual-level panel over eight years, our data allow us to verify common prereform trends, as well as to directly check whether fixed unobservable differences across individuals are responsible for both the decision to buy a house early or late in life and be more likely to enter entrepreneurship, by comparing specifications that do and don't use individual fixed effects. Second, our panel data covers household balance sheets and detailed information on startup outcomes, which allows us to directly trace the effect of the reform to the home equity channel and examine characteristics of the marginal entrant. For example, Schmalz, Sraer and Thesmar (2014) have extensive information on firms, but cannot observe house values or mortgage debt among respondents. They also study the impact of house price increases on the much smaller, and arguably different, subset of homeowners who do not have a mortgage. On the other hand, Corradin and Popov (2015) and Kerr, Kerr and Nanda (2015) have more granular data on individual characteristics and household balance sheets across a wide spectrum of home-owners, but are more limited in studying longer-term entrepreneurial outcomes. The unique combination of data on household balance sheets and firm outcomes, together with the reform itself, allows us to directly study how bypassing the banks' project-based screening impacted the quality of the marginal entrepreneur.
Our paper is also related to studies looking at the impact of bequests on entrepreneurship (e.g., Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Andersen and Nielsen, 2012) . A key element of our setting is that the reform we study covers the entire population of home owners and hence a cross-section of the wealth distribution, which provides us with more confidence on how these findings generalize across the population.
More generally, we believe that shedding light on the duel impact that home equity plays -in alleviating financing constraints but also shifting the focus of lenders away from the project's cash flows -provides a useful framework for understanding differences in the results across the studies above. Some of this work (e.g. Andersen and Nielsen, 2012; Kerr, Kerr and Nanda, 2015) has found the marginal entrant to be more likely to fail, while other work (e.g. Schamlz, Sraer and Thesmar, 2014) has found marginal entrants to be as good or better. Our work suggests that these differences will be driven by the extent to which the ease in financing constraints also shifts the focus of banks' screening away from project cash flows, and relatedly, quality of banks' screening technology across these settings. It also highlights that they are not mutually exclusive findings -in fact, our findings for individuals who have almost no mortgage are similar to both Schmalz, Sraer and Thesmar (2014) and Kerr, Kerr and Nanda (2015) .
III Data
We use a matched employer-employee panel dataset drawn from the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research in Denmark, which is maintained by the Danish Government and is referred to by its Danish acronym, IDA. IDA has a number of features that makes it very attractive for this study.
First, the data is collected from government registers on an annual basis, providing detailed data on the labor market status of individuals, including their primary occupation. An individual's primary occupation in IDA is characterized by their main occupation in the last week of November.
This allows us to identify entrepreneurs in precise manner that does not rely on survey evidence.
For example, we can distinguish the truly self-employed from those who are unemployed but may report themselves as self-employed in surveys. We can also distinguish the self-employed from those who employ others in their firm. Finally, since our definition of entrepreneurship is based on an individual's primary occupation code, we are also able to exclude part-time consultants and individuals who may set up a side business in order to shelter taxes. Second, the database is both comprehensive and longitudinal: all legal residents of Denmark and every firm in Denmark is included in the database. This is particularly useful in studying entry into entrepreneurship where such transitions are a rare event. Our sample size of entrepreneurs is therefore considerably larger than most studies of entrepreneurship at the individual level of analysis. Our analyses are based on a sample of about 300,000 individuals over the nine years from 1988-1996, leading to 2.7 million observations. It also allows us to control for many sources of heterogeneity at the individual level, by including individual fixed effects.
Third, the database links an individual's ID with a range of other demographic characteristics such as their age, gender, educational qualifications, marital status, number of children, as well as detailed information on income, assets and liabilities. 5 House value, cash holdings, mortgage debt, bank debt, and interest payments are reported automatically at the last day of the year by banks and other financial intermediaries to the tax authorities for all Danish tax payers and are therefore considered very reliable. While cash holdings and interest payments are recorded directly, the house value is the tax assessed value scaled by the ratio of the tax assessed value to market value as is recorded among traded houses in that municipality and year, and mortgage debt is recorded as the market value of the underlying bonds at the last day of the year. The remaining components, including the data on individual wealth, are self-reported, but subject to auditing by the tax authorities because of the presence of both a wealth tax and an income tax.
The detailed data on liabilities, assets and capital income is particularly useful for a study looking at entrepreneurship where wealth is likely to be correlated with a host of factors that can impact selection into entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004) . We match this individual-level data from IDA into two other registers: first, we match individuals to a register that tracks home ownership and the date that an individual last moved from an address. This register goes back to 1970, so although our panel starts in 1988, we are able to code the date of last move for a home owner in our database going back much further. As seen in Table   1 , this match allows us to document that the timing of the house purchase is a strong driver of the amount of equity an individual had in their house in 1991. Second, we match entrepreneurs in the IDA data to a register recording the VAT balances of firms. While the match on this register is not perfect (we are able to match 60% of the individuals we classify as entrepreneurs in the IDA data), we use this as a way to examine more details on firm outcomes such as the level of sales or profit at entry and over the life of the firm.
III.A Sample
Since we are exploiting a mortgage reform for our analysis, we focus on individuals who are homeowners in 1991 (the year before the reform). Among home owners, we focus on those who are between the age of 25 and 50 in 1991, to ensure that we do not capture individuals retiring into entrepreneurship. Therefore, the youngest person at the start of our sample (in 1988) is 22 and the oldest person at the end of our sample (in 1996) is 55. Finally, we focus on individuals who are not employed in the agricultural industry in 1991, because, like many western European nations, the agricultural sector in Denmark is subject to numerous subsidies and incentives that may interact with entrepreneurship. We create a nine year panel for a 25% random sample of these individuals can only be obtained for the total size of the liability stock.
(who were home owners, between the ages of 25 and 50 and not involved in the agricultural sector, all in 1991), yielding data on 303,431 individuals for the years 1988-1996. There is some attrition from our panel due to death (after 1991) and individuals who are living abroad and hence not in the tax system in a given year (both before and after 1991). However, as can be seen from Table 2, this attrition leads to less than a 1% fall relative to a balanced panel, yielding a total of 2,708,892 observations.
III.B Definition of Entrepreneurship
We focus our analysis of entrepreneurship on individuals who are employers (that is, self employed with at least one employee) in a given year. We use this measure to focus on more serious businesses and make our results more comparable with studies that use firm-level datasets (e.g. such as the Longitudinal Business Database in the US, that are comprised of firms with at least one employee) as well as those that study employment growth in the context of entrepreneurship. As shown in Figure   1 , these are also the entrepreneurs relying considerably on debt finance, who would be impacted by the reform. Figure 1 documents the trajectory of interest payments on total debt (including business and personal debt) for individuals in our sample who transitioned from employment to employers in 1990 -that is two years prior to the reform. 6 It compares the trajectory with individuals who transitioned from employment to being self-employed and those who remained in employment over the 1990 period. As seen in Figure 1 , those who transitioned to self-employment and to becoming employers had higher levels of interest payments but similar pre-trends. This is consistent with them being wealthier and owning larger houses, as shown in many papers linking personal wealth to the propensity to become an entrepreneur (e.g., Hurst and Lusardi, 2004) . However, Figure 1 also shows that the sharp increase in entrepreneurship around the year of entry is seen principally among employers as opposed to those entering self-employment. The increase in interest payments in the year of entry is equivalent to a 230,000 DKK increase in debt around the entry year (just under $40,000), and demonstrates that individuals were borrowing such sums from commercial banks to finance their businesses in the pre-reform period. Table 2 documents that about 3% of our sample are coded as entrepreneurs in a given year and that the annual probability that an individual enters entrepreneurship is 0.56%. These numbers are very consistent with those seen in US. 7
6 The 1990 cohort is useful because it gives us a two year "pre-trend" and allows us to look at debt accumulation up to a year after entry in the "pre-reform period".
7 For example, the Kauffman index of entrepreneurial activity, based on the CPS, estimates annual transition rates
IV Results
IV.A Identification Strategy
As noted in Sections IIA and IIB, the mortgage reform we study took effect in 1992, and enabled individuals, for the first time, to borrow against their home for uses other than the property itself. Our identification strategy exploits cross-sectional variation in the intensity of the reform's treatment across individuals. The reform allowed individuals to borrow up to a maximum of 80% of the home value. Even if individuals lowered their payments by extending a mortgage from 20-30 years, those with more than 0.75 in loan-to-value (LTV) would have not gained sufficient equity to extract any debt for non-housing purposes. We therefore focus on individuals with less than 0.75 in LTV or those with at least 0.25 in equity-to-value (ETV) in 1991 as our treated group. In our core specifications, we therefore compare the differential response of individuals who had home equity unlocked by the reform to those who did not get any equity unlocked. Given that the reform was first introduced in May of 1992 and data are recorded as of November, we include 1992 in our post-reform period and measure individual attributes as of 1991. The core specification takes the form:
where I (ET V 91 > 0.25) is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the individual was treated by the reform, P OST t is an indicator that takes a value of 1 for the period 1992-1996, X is a matrix of individual, region and industry-level controls, φ t refer to year fixed effects and δ i refer to individual fixed effects. While I (ET V 91 > 0.25) i is an indicator in the base specification, we also estimate specifications where I (ET V 91 > 0.25) i is expanded to be a vector of dummy variables indicating different levels of equity to value in 1991. We do this to explore whether effects vary with the amount of credit that house owners gain access to with the 1992 mortgage reform but without imposing arbitrary functional form assumptions. 8
Our key coefficient of interest is β, which measures the response of individuals who got access to home equity following the reform relative to those who did not get access. About 45% of the individuals in our sample were in the treated group. Given the structured mortgage system at the time, a significant driver of who got access was driven by when the home was purchased.
of 0.3%, Kerr, Kerr and Nanda (2015) use LEHD data to estimate transition rates of 0.6% and Corradin and Popov (2015) use the SIPP to estimate transition probabilities of 1%. 8 Note that the main effect for the post-period dummy and for being in the treated group are both absorbed by the year fixed effects, and the individual fixed effects respectively. Table 1 documents the equity to value (ETV), or the percentage of house value that is available to collateralize for investments other than the home, in the year prior to the reform, broken down by an individual's age and when they bought their house. As can be seen from Table 1 , the level of equity is much more stable across rows than within columns. That is, a significant driver of the amount of housing equity available to collateralize seems to be driven by the timing of the home's purchase. Those who bought their home after 1984 tend to have less than 25% of their housing equity available to draw on, while those who bought their houses earlier tend to have much greater housing equity available to borrow against. While age, which proxies for life cycle factors that would impact the timing of the home purchase, is clearly important, Table 1 documents that there is significant variation in available equity within age buckets, which in turn is strongly correlated with the year in which the house was bought.
As shown in equation (1) Our identification is therefore predicated on the assumption that, controlling for covariatetimes-year fixed effects, the timing of the house purchase is unrelated to the propensity to become an entrepreneur. Our discussion above helps document that the notion of using home equity did not exist before the reform and that it was passed quickly enough that it could not have directly impacted the decision to purchase of house to unlock collateral. Despite this, there may still be a concern that those who buy homes early vs. late may be systematically different along some unobserved dimension that may matter for entrepreneurship. We therefore also include individual fixed effects, δ i , to account for any fixed differences across individuals that we had not controlled for. Empirically, our inclusion of individual fixed effects does not impact the coefficients, suggesting that after including covariate-times-year fixed effects, the residual difference in the timing of house purchase across individuals is unrelated to our outcome variables of interest.
Equation (1) 
IV.B Descriptive Statistics
We start by documenting that the reform impacted a large number of individuals and that it was substantial. Figure 2 plots the amount of equity that was unlocked for the individuals in our sample. The X-axis buckets individuals into 100 bins of equity to value (ETV) in 1991. We then plot the amount of equity that was unlocked for individuals in each of these buckets (measured on the left Y-axis) at the mean, 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile. These lines document two important facts. First, the amount of equity unlocked was substantial. The average equity unlocked was 200,000 DKK ($33,819 using the end of 1991 exchange rate of 5.91). This amount was large both in relative terms (the median treated individual got access to at least a year's disposable income) and in terms of the starting capital of business, as documented in Figure 1 and in Appendix A. Some individuals with high levels of ETV had over 400,000 DKK (nearly $70,000) unlocked by this reform. Second, the slope of the lines are constant, which documents that the dollar value of equity unlocked was a constant proportion of the ETV in 1991. In other words, the average house value across those in different ETV buckets was extremely well-balanced, suggesting both that ETV in 1991 is a good measure for the total amount of credit that was unlocked across the buckets and that ETV did not vary dramatically across wealth. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics, comparing the covariates of the treated and control groups used in our subsequent analysis. The table highlights that on average, those in the treated group bought their house in 1979, whereas those in the control group bought their house in 1985.
This difference in the timing of when the home was bought is the key source of variation we want to exploit. Unsurprisingly, the individuals with greater than 0.25 in ETV are different from those with ETV below 0.25, along dimensions related to life cycle, wealth and family choice. For example, individuals in the treated group are older, somewhat less likely to have children, and are wealthier, which intuitively relate to having greater cash available for a downpayment or having bought the house earlier in time. However, as noted in Section IVA above, our estimation design aims to control for these differences (not only in levels, but also in terms of their differential impact across time) by interacting these covariates with a full set of year fixed effects. We also include individual fixed effects in our regressions to address residual sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
IV.C Borrowing based on Home Equity
We start by documenting that the channel through which the reform was meant to operate did in fact show substantial traction. We focus on interest payments on all outstanding debt rather than the debt level itself because we are able to measure interest payments on individual and firm borrowing, but do not have data on firm-level debt. The interest rate data also have the added attraction of being less noisy. 10 In Column 1 of Table 4 , we report the results estimating equation
(1) where the dependent variable is interest payments on debt.
As can be seen from column 1 of Table 4 , those in higher ETV buckets, by construction, had smaller interest payments prior to the reform. However, those in the treated group increased their interest payments by approximately 3,300 DKK more than the control group from 1992-1996. Column 2 shows that this was not driven by the fact that those in high ETV buckets were in municipalities that experienced differential house price changes or happened to be working in certain industries. It is robust to the inclusion of municipality-year and industry-year fixed effects.
Municipality-year fixed effects refer to a fixed effect for each of 297 municipalities interacted with year dummies. Industries are measured at the SIC 1 level and hence control for being in one of 9 industries associated with the individual's primary occupation in 1991. Finally in Column 3, we add individual fixed effects. Since our identification is driven off the timing of the house purchase relative to the reform -which, although unanticipated is not random -we need to account for the fact that those who bought their homes earlier may be systematically different to those who did not, say because of differential ability or preferences. Including individual fixed effects is particularly effective as it helps us document the impact of the reform within individual, by accounting for any fixed differences across individuals in our sample. The inclusion of individual fixed effects implies that our identification now comes from within-individual differences over time. The fact that the coefficients are so stable across columns 1-3 is reassuring, since it suggests that conditional on controlling appropriately for covariates, the amount of equity released by the reform was unrelated 10 The majority of debt is composed of mortgage debt which is recorded in our data by its market value which is influenced by market fluctuations in the interest rate. Only fixed rate mortgages are available in this period, and interest payments are therefore deterministically related to the coupon rate and thus free of influence from market fluctuations.
to fixed individual attributes.
Columns 4-6 of Table 4 break up the dummy variable I(ET V 91 > 0.25) i into three categories, so that we now compare how being in each of the top three quartiles of ETV distribution had an impact on credit extraction following the reform. The results again provide a clear pattern of increasing credit extraction for those with greater unlocked housing equity, with interest payments rising from about 2,000 DKK more in the post period for those whose ETV was between 0.25 and 0.5 to 4,600 DKK more for those in the highest ETV bucket. The magnitude of the increase in interest payments in column 3 corresponds to an increase in the debt level of about 37,031 DKK ($6,266) which is equivalent to homeowners borrowing an average of $0.19 for each dollar of housing collateral unlocked by the reform. Interestingly, this increase in borrowing is similar to the elasticity of borrowing reported by Mian and Sufi (2014) , when studying house price gains and US household spending from 2002-2006. 11 While on average, the increased borrowing is about a fifth of the increase in available collateral, a few people extract a lot of credit while many choose not to.
This variance in credit extraction is masked in the OLS regressions, but in unreported regressions
we find that a significant number of individuals increase debt by more than 300,000 DKK ($50,000).
The results from Table 4 therefore provide direct evidence of the home equity channel, a feature that has been inferred but not systematically documented as precisely in prior work.
IV.D Change in Net Entrepreneurship
Having established that the reform unlocked a significant amount of housing collateral and that those in the treatment group responded to this by increasing their personal debt, we now turn to study the impact of the reform on entrepreneurship. If credit constraints were holding back potential entrepreneurs in our sample, we should see that those who received an exogenous increase in access to credit would be more likely to be entrepreneurs. To examine this, we estimate equation
(1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the individual is coded as being an entrepreneur in year t. Table 5 are run as linear probability (OLS) models rather than non-linear logit or probit regressions given the large number of fixed effects. Since we include entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs in our sample in each year, these estimations measure the impact of the reform on net entrepreneurship (being an entrepreneur), as opposed to remaining an entrepreneur or becoming an entrepreneur, which we examine in subsequent analyses. Note that since our dependent variable is a binary variable, the regressions with individual fixed effects are effectively identifying off switchers -that is, those who either enter or exit entrepreneurship. The fact that, as with Table 4 , the coefficients on the interaction term P OST t * I(ET V 91 > 0.25) i are extremely stable is reassuring as it suggests that the subset of individuals who switched into or out of entrepreneurship was representative of the larger cross-section of individuals studied in Columns (1) and (2).
All regressions in
Columns 1-3 of Table 5 report the results for the indicator I(ET V 91 > 0.25) i and as with Table   4 , build up from including only covariate-year fixed effects to including individual fixed effects.
The coefficient on P OST t * I(ET V 91 > 0.25) i in column 3 of Table 5 implies a 12 basis point increase in net entrepreneurship. Given the baseline probability of being an entrepreneur was 3% in the pre-period (as seen in Table 2 ), this implies about a 4% relative increase in the probability of being an entrepreneur for the treated group in the post period. Figure 3 plots the coefficients of the dynamic specifications, where the interaction shown in column 3 is instead broken into annual interactions, and shown relative to 1992. The dynamic specifications show a pattern consistent with the reform driving the increases in net entrepreneurship and also show that the coefficient is in fact quite stable over the few years following the reform.
Columns 4-6 break the dummy variable I(ET V 91 > 0.25) i into three equal categories and show that the increase is driven largely by those with an ET V > 0.5. While those with an ET V > 0.25 and ET V < 0.5 do exhibit a slight increase, it is not statistically significant. The magnitudes in Column 6, together with the baseline entry rates shown in Table 3 suggest that the reform increased the propensity to be an entrepreneur for those with substantial increases in equity by about 5.5%.
Our results showing an increase in the amount of entrepreneurship leads us to examine the channel through which this occurred. The reform could have impacted existing businesses that were more likely to survive and/or impact the entry of new businesses. We turn to examining this next.
IV.E Entry into entrepreneurship
We look next at entry into entrepreneurship. Table 6 reports the coefficients from the linear probability models with the same specifications, where the dependent variable now takes a value of 1 if the individual was not an entrepreneur in t − 1 but became an entrepreneur in year t. As with Tables 4 and 5, Table 6 shows the coefficients are extremely stable across columns. It shows that there was also a marked increase in entry following the reform. Given that the baseline probability of entry is 0.56% (as seen in Table 2 ), the coefficient in column 3 of Table 9 implies that the treated group experienced a 10% increase in entry following the reform. Columns 4-6 show that similar to the patterns in Table 6 , the entry was largely driven by those in the highest ETV bucket, where the elasticity of entry was around 20%. Table 7 further breaks this entry into those starting businesses in industries that were classified as being more dependent on external finance vs. less dependent. Comparing columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 with column 3 of Table 6 shows that the majority of the increased entry came from those entering more capital intensive businesses. In fact, they show that the increase in less capital intensive industries was not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, entry into capital intensive industries was not only statistically significant, but larger than the entry into less capital intensive industries. This finding is also reinforced by looking at columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 , where the greatest impact of the reform seems to be among those in the highest ETV bucket starting businesses that were more dependent on external finance. 12
As noted above, the access to home equity will have been particularly valuable for individuals who were looking to get credit from commercial banks prior to the reform, but were unable to get sufficient credit for their business. The access to housing equity allowed them to bypass commercial banks and raise the capital based on the value of the collateral. If banks had a poor ability to screen, the marginal entrant who was able to bypass the commercial banks is likely to be of high quality.
On the other hand, if banks were screening well already, we may expect the marginal entrant to be weaker. Of course, these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is possible the commercial bank missed some high quality (or more risky) ventures, while generally being good at screening.
As a first step towards understanding the quality of the marginal entrant, we examine the extent to which the entrants start businesses that survive a long period of time. We separate entrants into those who started businesses that last three years or less, relative to those who found businesses that last at least 4 years. These results are reported in Table 8 . Comparing these businesses reveals a striking pattern. The vast majority of the entrants are those that fail within 3 years of entry. Figure 4 plots the coefficients from dynamic specifications corresponding to columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 . It further demonstrates how the increase in entry is driven by firms that fail within 3 years of entry: there is a strong response in entry among such firms that fail within a few years of entry, but no measurable response among businesses that survived longer.
Columns 3 and 4 show that the churning is associated with all the buckets of ETV, while those with the largest increase in available collateral also start some firms that last more than 3 years. This suggests that there is some evidence of high quality (or risky) ventures being started, despite the fact that on average, the marginal entrant seems to be worse. Interestingly, looking at columns 5 and 6 shows that one potential reason that these business owners seem to fail is because those in the treatment group significantly increase the likelihood that they will start businesses in industries where they have no prior experience. This result is interesting as it suggests that part of what the reform allowed individuals to do was experiment by starting businesses that the bank may not have given them credit for. This could be seen as either good or bad: on the one hand, if asymmetric information prevented banks from lending to high quality businesses, then the reform would facilitate the entry of better firms. For example, the banks might incorrectly ration credit to individuals who had no prior background in an industry, but who were potentially high quality entrepreneurs. Similarly, since banks are concerned with downside protection, it is possible that the access to housing collateral allowed individuals to start riskier firms, that may have been more likely to fail, but conditional on surviving, in fact did better. On the other hand, if banks were rationing credit to those who should not have started businesses because the projects were of low quality, this suggests that the credit market may have been working reasonably well prior to the reform.
In order to tease these two explanations apart, we turn to examine the intensive margin of performance for the entrants, using the VAT data we match to IDA. In Table 9 , we study the three-year gross profits, sales and employment of entrants, for all firms that entered between 1988 and 1996. These outcomes are obtained from VAT accounts, which as we outlined above, only give us a 60% match with the firms in our sample. 13 Since we have fewer observations in this table, we are unable to include a full set of controls interacted with year dummies but instead include individual controls observed in 1991 as well as year fixed effects in all regressions, and add municipality fixed effects for some specifications. Note that since we have one observation per firm in these specifications, we do not include individual fixed effects.
Although imprecisely estimated at times, the results tend to show that profits, sales and employment were lower in the post period for firms started by owners who got access to home equity, and even when considering the subset of entrants who survived at least three years in Columns 3-4, we do not find any evidence that the performance metrics improved as a consequence of the reform.
Columns 5-7 report the results from quantile regressions to show that the results in columns 1-4 are not driven by outliers and that they are equally present across the profit distribution. Overall, these results point to the fact that the reform seems to have lowered the discipline of external finance. 14 While we cannot conclusively say whether these were negative NPV projects, it suggests that the possibility of tapping into home equity either allowed individuals to start lower quality projects, that would have had a hard time getting financed by the bank, (but could be funded by personal debt since the bank was no longer lending based on the attributes of the project). That is, the marginal project funded in the post period by those with access to home equity was of lower quality than the average quality of projects started prior to the reform. This is an interesting result that also helps to reconcile the fact that gross entry following the reform was larger than the net effect of the reform on entrepreneurship.
IV.F Survival of existing businesses
To look at the impact of the reform on existing businesses, we focus on all individuals who were active entrepreneurs in 1988 and study the survival of these businesses until 1996. For these entrepreneurs, we run the same difference-in-difference specification outlined in equation (1) above, and where the dependent variable continues to take a value of 1 if they are alive in year t, but takes a value of 0 if they fail.
Looking across Columns 1-3 of Table 10 , we can see that as with prior tables the inclusion of industry-year, municipality-year and individual fixed effects do not impact the coefficient on P OST t * I(ET V 91 > 0.25) i . The coefficient in column 3 of Table 6 documents a statistically significant effect on survival for existing businesses. About 65% of the businesses in the control group are still alive in 1996, implying that the 3.2 percentage point increase in survival is equivalent to a 5% higher likelihood of survival relative to those with low ETV. Columns 4-6 show that these effects are even stronger for those that received the largest treatment, rising to about a 7% higher chance of survival relative to the control group for those in the highest quartile of ETV.
Although we see existing firms being more likely to survive when their owners receive a larger increase in available credit, this could also be driven by two possible mechanisms. On the one hand, it could imply that firms that were previously constrained (for example, high growth firms) were forced to shut down and could now benefit from the increased credit availability to support the operations of the firm. On the other hand, one might imagine that the increase in credit may have led firms that were badly run to continue operating because their founders had a preference for being self employed, but did not need to justify this decision to the bank. To tell these two mechanisms apart, we look in Table 10 at firm performance for the set of firms that were in existence at the time of reform. In particular, we focus on firm-level employment, sales and gross profit (sales less purchases). These outcomes are obtained from VAT accounts, which as we outlined above, only
give us a 60% match with the firms in our sample.
We focus our analysis in Table 11 on the set of firms that survived until 1996, so we are not confounding performance and survival. That is, given that we know the reform increased the chances of survival, we do not want this extensive margin effect to impact our intensive margin calculation. We find that although the estimates are imprecisely estimated, the marginal firm that benefited from the reform seems to have lower point estimates. While we cannot reject that the firms were of the same quality, we do not find evidence that surviving firms perform significantly better due to their ability to extract home equity. In sum, our results suggest that the reform increased survival, but that it did not lead to an increase in performance conditional on survival. It may even have led to slightly weaker firms to continue because they could 'consume' entrepreneurship by borrowing against their home.
V Discussion and Conclusions
We combine a unique mortgage reform with micro data to study how home equity finance impacted entrepreneurship. A unique element of our setting is the fact that prior to the 1992 reform, individuals in Denmark were precluded for borrowing against their home for uses other than financing the underlying property. The reform therefore enabled home equity loans for the first time, and hence allowed individuals who were constrained to bypass bank screening and borrow based on the strength of their housing collateral. We highlight how this has the potential to alter the marginal individual selecting into entrepreneurship. In particular, if banks' screening technology works well, but potential entrepreneurs are overconfident or have non-pecuniary motivations for entry, the marginal entrant who bypasses the bank's screening based on the startup's merit is likely to start lower quality, or more risky ventures.
Our unique micro-data allows us to study both the response to the relaxed constraints and the characteristics of the marginal entrant. We find the reform lead to a 10% increase in entry on average, with substantially stronger increases in more capital intensive industries and among individuals who had more equity going into the reform. Yet, on average, the marginal entrant was weaker: they started businesses in industries they were not working in prior to entry, they were more likely to fail and conditional on survival had weaker performance. We do find evidence of some long-term entry, but these entrants did not perform better than the control group. Our evidence points to the fact that while commercial banks missed some high quality ventures, they were generally good at screening based on project quality. Despite asymmetric information and opacity in startup lending, our results highlight how banks' screening plays an important role in credit allocation to more promising entrepreneurs. This is similar to findings by Kerr and Nanda (2009) who find that while the US banking deregulations over the 1980s led to an increase in entrepreneurship, a disproportionate share of this increase was in churning entry, implying that the net effect of deregulation was less than that suggested by papers looking only at gross entry (Black and Strahan, 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006) . This work also emphasizes the importance of considering both entry and net entrepreneurship as outcome variables, since policies that aim to increase entry may not necessarily translate into equivalent increases in net entrepreneurship if the marginal entrants are of lower quality and are more likely to fail.
Our results therefore paint a more nuanced picture of the extent to which home equity alleviates financing constraints. The fact that housing collateral shifts the bank's adjudication decision from a specific project to the creditworthiness of the borrower has the potential to be a dual edged sword: on the one hand, good projects that were precluded from entry due to asymmetric information may be able to be started or sustained. On the other hand, optimistic entrepreneurs or those with non-pecuniary benefits to own businesses may start lower quality businesses because they do not face the same discipline from the bank. More generally, we believe that shedding light on the duel impact that home equity plays -in alleviating financing constraints but also shifting the focus of lenders away from the project's cash flows -provides a useful framework for understanding differences in the results across the studies on credit constraints and entrepreneurship. This work has found different magnitudes in response to available credit and also different characteristics of entrants. Our work suggests that these differences will be driven by the extent to which relaxing financing constraints also shifts the focus of banks' screening away from project cash flows and quality of banks' screening technology across these settings. Table 1 shows the mean equity to value in 1991 by age of individual and the year of house purchase. Based on a 25% sample. Cells with fewer than 100 observations are excluded.
Year of last move
Age in 1991 This table presents summary statistics for the 303,431 individuals in our sample based on whether they were in the treated or control group in 1991. The treated group comprises individuals whose equity-tovalue (ETV) in 1991 was between 0.25 and 1. The control group are those whose ETV in 1991 was less than 0.25. Housing assets refer to the tax assessed valuation of the individual's property scaled with the ratio of market prices to tax assessed house values for house that have been traded in that municipality and year. Non housing assets include the individual's other assets including stocks, bonds and bank deposits. All variables are measured as of 1991, the year before the reform.
(1)
Post*I(ETV91>0.25) 3,318 *** 3,335 *** 3,288 *** (249) This table reports estimates from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual is an entrepreneur in a given year. The main RHS variables are the bucket of equity to value in 1991 and the buckets interacted with an indicator for the post mortgage reform period. All columns include year fixed effects interacted with fixed effects for birth-cohort, declie of wealth, educational level, partner, gender and having children, each measured in 1991. Column (2-3) and (5-6) include municipality-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Column (3) and (6) further include individual fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistically different from zero at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level.
(1) This table reports estimates from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual is an entrepreneur in a given year and was not an entrepreneur in the prior year. The main RHS variables are the bucket of equity to value in 1991 and the buckets interacted with an indicator for the post mortgage reform period. All columns include year fixed effects interacted with fixed effects for birth-cohort, decile of wealth, educational level, partner, gender and having children, each measured in 1991. Column (2-3) and (5-6) include municipality-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Column (3) and (6) This table reports estimates from a linear probability model where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the individual was an entrepreneur in a given year and not an entrepreneur in the prior year. The main RHS variable of interest is the bucket of equity to value in 1991 and the buckets interacted with an indicator for the post mortgage reform period. Columns (1-4) delimits the outcome variable to entries that survived at least 3 years after entry (≥ 3 years), or less than 3 years after entry (< 3 years). Columns (5-8) delimit the entry variable to entries that occurred in the the same industry as the individual was occupied in prior to entry (Exp) or entries occurring in another industry than the individual was previously occupied in (No Exp). All columns include year fixed effects interacted with fixed effects for birth-cohort, educational level, partner, gender and having children, all measured in 1991. All columns also include municipality-year fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects and individual fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistically different from zero at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. 
- (92) - (148) - (160) - (56) - (74) - ( - (76) - (80) - (125) - (138) - (48) - (64) - ( - (329) - (334) - (590) - (614) - (128) - (216) - ( - (294) - (300) - (531) - (554) - (103) - (178) - ( [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] , for whom we could find a match in the VAT register. The main RHS variables are the bucket of equity to value in 1991 and the buckets interacted with the post mortgage reform period indicator. All columns include year fixed effects interacted with fixed effects for birth-cohort, wealth decile, educational level, partner, gender and having children, each measured in 1991, municipality-year fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects and individual fixed effects. Columns 1-3 report the results for all individuals so conflate performance with survival, while Columns 4-6 restrict the sample to those who survived till 1996. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistically different from zero at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Figure 1 shows the change in interest payments around the year of entry for individuals in our sample who entered entrepreneurship in 1990. The change in interest payments for those transitioning from employment to becoming employers was equivalent to a $40,000 increase in debt in the year of entry. The change for those transitioning from employment to being self-employed was significantly smaller while those remaining in employment saw no change in their debt level. Kroner, of housing equity that was unlocked by the reform, for individuals with different levels of equity-to-value in 1991, ranked from the 1 st to the 99 th percentile in ETV. The released equity is calculated as value of the house in 1991, multiplied by the difference between the equity-to-value in the house in 1991 and the 80% threshold that individuals were allowed to borrow up to. Table 8 , where an indicator of being an individual who was treated by the reform is interacted with year dummies and shown relative to 1992. As with columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 , it shows that churning entry increased substantially after the reform relative to the control group, while longer-term entry did not change on a relative basis. The model includes the full set of covariate-year fixed effects as well as individual fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
Figure 1: Increase in Debt at Founding
Appendix A: Capital Intensity measures
Our measure of capital intensity is constructed from the reliance of external finance of firm starts in the pre-reform period. With 111-industry classifications, we take all entries occurring in the period from 1988-1991 into a given industry and take the average change in total interest payment from time t-1 to time t of the entrepreneur starting a firm in a given industry at time t. We next sort these industry averages from high to low and define high capital intensive industries as industries above the median. The median change is 28,000 DKK (approximately 4,700 USD). With a prevailing interest rate of roughly 10% in the period this corresponds to a debt increase of 280,000 DKK (approximately 47,000 USD) for an individual starting a median capital intensive firm.
As validation exercise of our capital intensity measure, table A1 reports the correlation coefficients with other measures of capital intensity, both weighted and un-weighted by the number of entries that occurs in a given industry. First, the measure is robust to measuring interest payments from t-1 to t+1 as opposed to t-1 to t relative to entry. Further, the change interest rate payments associated with entry in a given industry is positively correlated with the first year record sales for the same industry. Finally the measure is positively correlated with the mean and median amount of external financing need reported in the Survey of Small Business (SSB) based on US-data at the 2-digit SIC level. Table A1 reports correlation coefficients between average changes in total interest payments from t-1 to t for an entrepreneur entering a given industry in 1988-1991 with other measures of capital intensity. First year sales are computed based on the firms for which we observe VAT data during its first year of operation. SSB average and median are survey numbers taken Survey of Small Business. * Indicate significance at the 10% level. Figure A1 below shows the distribution of increases in interest payments at business start-ups across selected G111 industries. We define capital-intensive industries as industries that have above median growth in interest payments at the point of the start-up as is indicated by the red line. The figure shows that there is considerable variation within broad industry classes, so that we observe entries that are capital intensive and not within almost all broad industry groups.
Figure A1: Capital intensity by G111-industries
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